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I. INTRODUCTION 
A widely accepted ancient legal maxim1 states that “ignorance of 
fact may excuse; ignorance of law does not excuse.”2  But what if the 
 
 †  J.D. Candidate 2005, William Mitchell College of Law; B.F.A. Minneapolis 
College of Art and Design, 1987. 
 1. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 883 (5th ed. 1979) (defining maxim as “[a] principle 
of law universally admitted as being a correct statement of the law, or as agreeable to 
reason”). 
 2. Advanced Estimating Sys., Inc. v. Riney, 130 F.3d 996, 999 (11th Cir. 1997) 
(citation omitted) (holding that an attorney’s misunderstanding of a rule’s plain language 
1
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ignorance is that of the attorney and not the client?  The common remedy 
for clients in civil matters who are denied their day in court due to 
negligence or mistake on the part of their counsel is to seek damages 
through a malpractice suit.3  While Minnesota courts have long stated the 
liberal policy of declining to penalize litigants for neglect or mistakes of 
their attorneys,4 the courts are not always equally liberal in applying that 
policy.5 
Recently, in the case of In re Welfare of J.R., Jr.,6 a proceeding 
involving the termination of a mother’s parental rights, the Minnesota 
Supreme Court was faced with the issue of whether to affirm a court of 
appeals order dismissing the mother’s appeal for failure to timely serve 
notice on the child’s guardian ad litem,7 or to excuse the delay under an 
analysis similar to that required when a party seeks relief from a final 
judgment or order under Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02 (“Rule 
60.02”).8  The appellant argued that in cases involving the termination of 
 
cannot constitute excusable neglect); see also Midwest Employers Cas. Co. v. Williams, 
161 F.3d 877, 879 (5th Cir. 1998) (overruling the magistrate’s holding that late filing of 
an appeal was excusable because counsel misread a rule). 
 3. See, e.g., Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 634 n.10 (1962); Pryor v. 
U.S. Postal Serv., 769 F.2d 281, 289 (5th Cir. 1985); Murray v. Solidarity of Labor Org. 
Int’l Union Benefit Fund, 172 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1143 (N.D. Iowa 2001); State v. Linder, 
33 P.3d 1023, 1025 (Or. Ct. App. 2001). 
 4. See, e.g., Nguyen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 558 N.W.2d 487, 491 
(Minn. 1997) (agreeing that a client “should not be a victim of his attorney’s 
carelessness”); Charson v. Temple Israel, 419 N.W.2d 488, 491 (Minn. 1988) 
(recognizing that even though under the general principles of agency where attorney 
neglect is chargeable to the client, the court has scrutinized the client’s actions apart from 
that of the attorney); Duenow v. Lindeman, 223 Minn. 505, 518, 27 N.W.2d 421, 429 
(1947) (“Courts will relieve parties from the consequences of the neglect or mistakes of 
their attorney when it can be done without substantial prejudice to their adversaries.”). 
 5. See, e.g., In re Welfare of J.R., Jr., 655 N.W.2d 1, 3-6 (Minn. 2003) (refusing 
appellant’s request that the court excuse late filing of appeal by one of the parties to the 
matter when the late filing was due to error on the part of the attorney); In re D.B., 463 
N.W.2d 301, 303 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990) (dismissing appellant’s untimely appeal where 
error was committed by appellant’s attorney). 
 6. 655 N.W.2d 1 (Minn. 2003). 
 7. BLACK’S, supra note 1, at 635 (defining guardian ad litem as “a special 
guardian appointed by the court to prosecute or defend, on behalf of an infant . . . a suit to 
which he is a party, and such guardian is considered an officer of the court to represent 
the interests of the infant . . . in the litigation”).  In Minnesota, a guardian ad litem is a 
party to a termination of parental rights action.  MINN. R. JUV. P. 57.01 subd. 1.  The 
guardian ad litem is appointed by the court to protect, monitor, and advocate for the 
child’s best interests throughout the judicial proceeding.  MINN. STAT. § 260C.163 subd. 
5(b)(4) (2002). 
 8. J.R., 655 N.W.2d at 4.  Although the appeal had not been timely filed with the 
guardian ad litem, the appeal had been timely served with the court of appeals and with 
the respondent.  Id. at 2. 
2
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parental rights, a technical violation of the rules should not prevent the 
appeal from proceeding.9  However, the court refused to apply a Rule 
60.02 type analysis and chose not to exercise its inherent power to hear 
an untimely appeal in the interests of justice.10  Basing its decision 
largely on the policy that child protection cases need to be handled 
expeditiously, the court held that an untimely appeal deprives the 
appellate court of jurisdiction and affirmed the court of appeals order.11 
Part II of this note explores the primary legal concepts raised in 
J.R.: the application of a Rule 60.02 analysis,12 the effect that an 
untimely appeal has on jurisdiction of Minnesota appellate courts,13 and 
extensions for time to appeal under the federal rules.14  Part III reviews 
the pertinent facts of J.R. as well as the court’s holding and stated policy 
for reaching that decision.15  Part IV analyzes the court’s decision and 
current precedent from other jurisdictions that may provide insight and 
guidance.16  It also examines the policy behind J.R. and provides a 
context in which the effectiveness of that policy should be judged.17 
Finally, this note suggests that in the case of J.R., the Minnesota 
Supreme Court should have recognized that in some civil cases, such as 
those involving termination of parental rights, the accepted civil remedy 
of allowing clients to recover for the failure of counsel through a 
malpractice suit is inadequate.18  The court should have used an 
excusable neglect analysis rather than a Rule 60.02 analysis to examine 
the reason for the attorney’s failure to file a timely appeal.19  Upon 
satisfaction of the excusable neglect analysis, the court should have 
exercised its constitutional power to hear a late appeal in the interests of 
justice.20 
 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. at 4. 
 11. Id. at 5-6. 
 12. See infra Part II.A. 
 13. See infra Part II.B. 
 14. See infra Part II.C. 
 15. See infra Part III. 
 16. See infra Part IV.A.1-2. 
 17. See infra Part IV.A.3. 
 18. See infra Part IV.B. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
3
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II. BACKGROUND 
A.  Relief Under Minnesota Rule 60.02 
Traditionally, the subject of granting relief from a judgment was 
denominated as equitable relief.21  Infused with notions associated with 
equity jurisdiction, equitable relief included the familiar concepts of: 
“discretion on the part of the court, due diligence on the part of the 
applicant for relief, and the balancing of interests as between the 
parties . . . and the public concerns for both just adjudication and the 
finality of judgments.”22  Modern procedures, particularly those similar 
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), have largely superseded the 
need for an independent suit in equity.23 
The Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure became effective on 
January 1, 1952, and were in large part taken verbatim from the 
corresponding Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.24  Minnesota Rule 
60.02, like its federal counterpart Rule 60(b), provides in part that on 
motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party 
from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: 
mistake, inadvertence, surprise, excusable neglect, or any other reason 
justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.25 
In determining whether relief should be granted under Rule 60.02, 
Minnesota courts traditionally have employed a four-prong test that 
requires the party seeking relief to demonstrate: “(1) a reasonable 
defense on the merits; (2) a reasonable excuse for . . . failure to act; (3) 
that [the party] acted with due diligence after notice of the entry of 
judgment; and (4) that no substantial prejudice will result to the opposing 
 
 21. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS ch. 5, introductory note (1982). 
 22. Id. 
 23. JAMES FLEMING, JR. & GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 13.15 (2d ed. 
1977).  The suit in equity still has a function where the attack on the judgment is made by 
a person who was not a party to the suit or where the person who obtained the judgment 
sues on it in another jurisdiction.  Id. 
 24. 1 DOUGLAS D. MCFARLAND & WILLIAM J. KEPPEL, MINNESOTA CIVIL PRACTICE 
§ 131 (2d ed. 1990). 
 25. Compare MINN. R. CIV. P. 60.02 with FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b).  “The federal 
courts’ interpretation of federal rules of civil procedure often provide guidance to state 
courts in their interpretation of parallel rules.”  Edward T. Matthews, Case Note, The 
Unfortunate Elevation of Finality Over Validity—Bode v. Minn. Dep’t of Natural Res., 
28 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1217, 1226 n.78 (2002) (citing DLH, Inc. v. Russ, 566 
N.W.2d 60, 69 (Minn. 1997)).  Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was 
modeled after section 473 of the California Code of Civil Procedure.  12 JAMES WM. 
MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 60 App.100[1] (3d ed. 1999). 
4
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party if the motion to vacate is granted.”26  In Minnesota, all four prongs 
must be satisfied in order to justify relief.27  If the district court fails to 
apply the four-prong test, the appellate court will do so de novo.28 
Because a Rule 60 motion29 is part of or a continuation of the 
original action, it generally must be made in the court that rendered 
judgment.30  The court that entered judgment has automatic jurisdiction 
and is in the best position to judge the merits of the motion.31  However, 
the right to be relieved of judgment is not absolute, even upon a showing 
of the prerequisites for relief.32  Whether to vacate a judgment is at the 
trial court’s discretion, and the decision will not be reversed on appeal 
absent a clear abuse of discretion.33 
B.  Untimely Appeals and Appellate Court Jurisdiction in Minnesota 
The Minnesota Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure were adopted by 
the Minnesota Supreme Court in 1967, and in large part they superseded 
previous statutory provisions relating to appeals.34  Prior to the adoption, 
although appellate procedure was generally regulated by statutory 
provisions, commentary and case law suggest that the court’s acceptance 
of these legislative prescriptions was a result of comity35 and not a result 
of legislative power over the supreme court.36 
 
 26. Nguyen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 558 N.W.2d 487, 490 (Minn. 1997) 
(citation omitted).  The four-prong test has been used in Minnesota since the late 1800s.  
See Brown v. Brown, 37 Minn. 128, 129, 33 N.W. 546, 547 (1887) (using similar 
elements in a relief for good cause analysis). 
 27. Charson v. Temple Israel, 419 N.W.2d 488, 491-92 (Minn. 1988). 
 28. Carter v. Anderson, 554 N.W.2d 110, 115 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996). 
 29. “Rule 60 motion” refers to a motion for relief from final judgment under federal 
or state law. 
 30. MOORE, supra note 25, at § 60.60[1]; see also United States v. Shaughnessy, 
175 F.2d 211, 212 (2d Cir. 1949) (refusing to transform improper collateral attack on 
denaturalization decree into a Rule 60(b) motion because it was not filed in the court that 
rendered original judgment); Bankers Mortgage Co. v. United States, 423 F.2d 73, 78 & 
n.9 (5th Cir. 1970) (noting that a motion for relief from final judgment must be filed in 
the court in which the original judgment was entered). 
 31. MOORE, supra note 25, at § 60.60[1]. 
 32. See Bentonize, Inc. v. Green, 431 N.W.2d 579, 583 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988). 
 33. See, e.g., Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Dain Bosworth, Inc., 531 N.W.2d 867, 873-
74 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995); Riley ex rel. Swanson v. Herbes, 524 N.W.2d 523, 526 (Minn. 
Ct. App. 1994). 
 34. 3 ERIC J. MAGNUSON & DAVID F. HERR, MINNESOTA PRACTICE § 101.4 (3d ed. 
1996). 
 35. BLACK’S, supra note 1, at 242 (defining comity as “a willingness to grant a 
privilege, not as a matter of right, but out of deference and good will”). 
 36. State v. M.A.P., 281 N.W.2d 334, 336-37 (Minn. 1979); MAGNUSON & HERR, 
supra note 34, at § 101.4. 
5
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Rule 104.01 of Civil Appellate Procedure sets forth the rules for 
determining timeliness of appeals in Minnesota for most civil cases.37  
Under Rule 104.01, an appeal must be taken within sixty days after the 
entry of a judgment.38  This time limit applies in all cases, unless a 
different time is specified by statute.39  In juvenile protection cases, such 
as the termination of a natural parent’s parental rights, Minnesota Rule of 
Juvenile Procedure 82.02 subdivision 2 controls the time allowed to take 
an appeal.40  Under Rule 82.02 subdivision 2, an appeal must be taken 
within thirty days of the filing of the appealable order.41  “Limitations on 
time to appeal are designed to expedite the final resolution of litigation, 
with due consideration to fairness and certainty of procedure.”42  Failure 
to file a timely appeal with the court is a defect that deprives the 
appellate court of jurisdiction to hear the appeal.43  Furthermore, under 
case law and statute, the appellate courts may not extend the time to 
appeal.44 
Rule 103.01 of Civil Appellate Procedure requires that in addition 
to serving notice on the court, “adverse parties” must also be served 
within the appeals period.45  In contrast, Rule 82.02 subdivision 3 of the 
Rules of Juvenile Procedure states that in addition to the court and 
county attorney, “all parties” or their counsel, if represented, must be 
served within the appeals period.46  Failure to properly serve a required 
 
 37. See MINN. R. CIV. APP. P. 104.01; see also LAURA S. UNDERKUFFLER & DAVID 
W. LARSON, CIVIL APPELLATE PRACTICE IN THE MINNESOTA COURT OF APPEALS 47 
(1986). 
 38. MINN. R. CIV. APP. P. 104.01 subd. 1. 
 39. MAGNUSON & HERR, supra note 34, at § 104.1. 
 40. In re Welfare of J.R., Jr., 655 N.W.2d 1, 2-3 (Minn. 2003). 
 41. MINN. R. JUV. P. 82.02 subd. 2. 
 42. E.C.I. Corp. v. G.G.C. Co., 306 Minn. 433, 435, 237 N.W.2d 627, 629 (1976) 
(stating that a modification of judgment does not extend the time to appeal issues that 
could have been raised in an appeal from the first judgment; holding that an incorrect 
original judgment justified an equitable exception to the rule). 
 43. See, e.g., Tischendorf v. Tischendorf, 321 N.W.2d 405, 409 (Minn. 1982) (“In 
Minnesota, the failure to make a timely appeal is a jurisdictional defect.”); Township of 
Honner v. Redwood County, 518 N.W.2d 639, 641 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that 
court of appeals lacks jurisdiction to hear a late appeal); Nichols v. Meilahn, 444 N.W.2d 
872, 875 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989) (stating the limitation of time to appeal is jurisdictional). 
 44. Schaust v. Town Bd., 295 Minn. 571, 573, 204 N.W.2d 646, 648 (1973) 
(holding that the court cannot extend the time for an appeal); In re LeBrun, 458 N.W.2d 
139, 143 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that the limitation of time to appeal is 
jurisdictional and the court cannot extend the time for appeal).  Minnesota Rules of Civil 
Appellate Procedure 126.02 allows appellate courts to extend time periods but 
specifically prohibits extending the time to appeal.  MINN. R. CIV. APP. P. 126.02. 
 45. See MINN. R. CIV. APP. P. 103.01(1). 
 46. Compare MINN. R. CIV. APP. P. 103.01 subd. 1 with MINN. R. JUV. P. 82.02 
subd. 3(a).  Rule 57.01 subdivision 1 of the Rules of Juvenile Procedure expressly 
6
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party within the proper time period is a jurisdictional defect requiring 
dismissal on the part of the appellate court47 and jurisdiction may not be 
waived by the parties.48 
Although older case law is strict in stating that the Minnesota 
Supreme Court lacks jurisdiction when an appeal is not timely filed,49 the 
court in recent years has carved out an exception that it may hear any 
appeal in the interests of justice whether the appeal was timely or not.50  
The court, recognizing that this power appears to contravene statute and 
previous case law, justified its newly stated authority by questioning 
whether the court’s jurisdiction to hear suits on appeal could be denied 
by the legislature.51  The court noted that article 6, section 2 of the 
Minnesota Constitution grants the Minnesota Supreme Court “original 
jurisdiction in such remedial cases as may be prescribed by law, and 
appellate jurisdiction in all cases . . . .”52  The court has stated that 
regulations enacted by the legislature are acceptable on comity principles 
to assist the court in the procedural aspects of appellate review, but not to 
deny the court of its independent appellate authority to review any matter 
it finds necessary in the interests of justice.53  Although the court has 
 
provides that the child’s guardian ad litem is a party to a juvenile protection matter.  
MINN. R. JUV. P. 57.01 subd. 1. 
 47. See Johnson v. Nessel Town, 486 N.W.2d 834, 837 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992) 
(dismissing appeal for failure to serve one of the respondents); Petersen v. Petersen, 352 
N.W.2d 797, 797 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (deciding against appellant who failed to serve 
notice of appeal on respondent within time limit). 
 48. See, e.g., Arndt v. Minn. Educ. Ass’n, 270 Minn. 489, 490, 134 N.W.2d 136, 
137 (1965) (“[P]arties cannot waive the objection or by stipulation clothe this court with 
authority to determine a belated appeal.”); Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 857 v. Seem, 263 Minn. 
170, 174, 116 N.W.2d 395, 398 (1962) (holding parties cannot waive objection to 
untimely appeal). 
 49. See, e.g., Ardnt, 270 Minn. at 490, 134 N.W.2d at 137 (holding the supreme 
court loses jurisdiction on an untimely appeal); Schaust, 295 Minn. at 573, 204 N.W.2d at 
648 (holding the supreme court cannot extend the time for an appeal). 
 50. See, e.g., Ruberg v. Skelly Oil Co., 297 N.W.2d 746, 749 (Minn. 1980) 
(accepting untimely appeal as an appeal from judgment); Krug v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 
16, 293 N.W.2d 26, 29 (Minn. 1980) (taking a late appeal in the interests of justice); State 
v. M.A.P., 281 N.W.2d 334, 336-37 (Minn. 1979) (declining to take jurisdiction of late 
appeal, but stating the authority to do so); E.C.I. Corp. v G.G.C. Co., 306 Minn. 433, 
435-36, 237 N.W.2d 627, 629 (1976) (“The rules of this court are designed to effectuate 
the orderly administration of justice and do not control its jurisdiction, for it retains the 
constitutional power to hear and determine, as a matter of discretion, any appeal in the 
interest of justice.”). 
 51. State v. M.A.P., 218 N.W.2d 334, 336 (Minn. 1979). 
 52. Id.; MINN. CONST. art. VI, § 2. 
 53. M.A.P., 281 N.W.2d at 336-37; see also In re O’Rourke, 300 Minn. 158, 175, 
220 N.W.2d 811, 821 (1974) (stating that past cases do not hold that the legislature may 
by regulation deny the court its constitutional authority to review); MAGNUSON & HERR, 
supra note 34, at § 101.4 (discussing that by exercising the power to hear untimely 
7
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used this power to hear late appeals very sparingly, some commentary 
has suggested that lower appellate courts may have the same inherent 
power as the supreme court to take any appeal.54  Appellate courts have 
so far refused to exercise that power.55 
C.  Federal Rules for Extending the Time to Appeal Due to 
Excusable Neglect 
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(5) permits the district 
court to extend the time for filing an appeal in a civil case if the party 
seeking the extension shows excusable neglect or good cause.56  A party 
may make a motion for an extension before the time for appeal has run or 
within a thirty-day grace period after the time for appeal has expired.57  
The good cause standard applies in situations where the delay was not 
due to fault, excusable or otherwise.58  Traditionally, the excusable 
neglect standard is applied in situations where there is fault or the delay 
is within the control of the movant.59  The authority to grant an extension 
under Rule 4(a)(5) is limited to the district court; the court of appeals 
cannot extend the time for filing notice of appeal.60 
In the 1993 United States Supreme Court decision of Pioneer 
Investment Services v. Brunswick Associates,61 the Court moved beyond 
the traditional excusable neglect standard and adopted a flexible standard 
that takes into account all the relevant circumstances.62 Such 
circumstances include: “the danger of prejudice to [the nonmoving 
party], the length of the delay and its potential impact on judicial 
 
appeals, the Minnesota Supreme Court is perhaps blurring the constitutional separation of 
powers). 
 54. MAGNUSON & HERR, supra note 34, at § 101.4. 
 55. See Limongelli v. GAN Nat’l Ins. Co., 590 N.W.2d 167, 169 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1999) (holding time to file notice of appeal may not be extended); Township of Honner v. 
Redwood County, 518 N.W.2d 639, 641 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that even though 
the Minnesota Supreme Court has indicated it has the authority to accept untimely 
appeals, that authority has not been extended to the lower appeals courts). 
 56. FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(5)(ii). 
 57. FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(5)(i). 
 58. Gibbons v. United States, 317 F.3d 852, 854 n.3 (8th Cir. 2003) (explaining 
advisory notes to 2002 amendment to rule 4(a)(5)). 
 59. Ponterelli v. Stone, 930 F.2d 104, 111 n.10 (1st Cir. 1991). 
 60. See, e.g., United States v. Detrich, 940 F.2d 37, 38 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding, 
however, that timely communication from a pro se litigant constituted a request justifying 
extension); In re Hoag Ranches, 846 F.2d 1225, 1229 (9th Cir. 1988); Savage v. Cache 
Valley Dairy Ass’n, 737 F.2d 887, 889 (10th Cir. 1984).  Federal rules prevent appellate 
courts from enlarging the time for notice of appeals.  FED. R. APP. P. 26(b). 
 61. 507 U.S. 380 (1993). 
 62. Id. at 395. 
8
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proceedings, the reason for the delay, including whether it was within the 
reasonable control of the movant, and whether the movant acted in good 
faith.”63  The Court held that “excusable neglect is understood to 
encompass situations in which the failure to comply with a filing 
deadline is attributable to negligence.”64  Furthermore, the determination 
of whether failure to abide by a specified time limit constitutes excusable 
neglect is an equitable one.65  The Pioneer decision makes it clear that in 
some circumstances, attorney neglect, mistake, or carelessness can 
constitute excusable neglect.66 
Although Pioneer was based on bankruptcy law,67 its excusable 
neglect standard has been adopted by a majority of the federal circuits as 
the proper standard for district courts to apply when exercising the 
discretion of whether or not to extend the time to appeal a civil case 
under Rule 4(a)(5).68  The Eighth Circuit adopted the Pioneer standard in 
Fink v. Union Central Life Insurance Co.69  The Fink case was a major 
departure from previous case law, which held that excusable neglect 
could not be found when the failure to timely appeal was caused by 
oversight or clerical error of the attorney or the attorney’s staff, or due to 
the attorney’s busy schedule.70 
Several states have enacted rules that are similar to Rule 4(a)(5) and 
 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. at 394. 
 65. Id. at 395. 
 66. See id. at 388 (stating that where the courts were empowered to accept late 
filings due to excusable neglect, “Congress plainly contemplated that the courts would be 
permitted, where appropriate, to accept late filings caused by inadvertence, mistake, or 
carelessness, as well as by intervening circumstances beyond the party’s control”); see 
also MOORE, supra note 25, at § 60.41[1][a] (interpreting effects of Pioneer to include 
attorney neglect or negligence). 
 67. Pioneer actually defined excusable neglect as applied to FED. R. BANKR. P. 
9006(b)(1).  Pioneer, 507 U.S. at 382. 
 68. See, e.g., Halicki v. Louisiana Casino Cruises, Inc., 151 F.3d 465, 469 (5th Cir. 
1998); Prizevoits v. Indiana Bell Tel. Co., 76 F.3d 132, 134 (7th Cir. 1996); Thompson v. 
E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., 76 F.3d 530, 533 (4th Cir. 1996); Advance Estimating 
Sys., Inc. v. Riney, 130 F.3d 996, 997-98 (11th Cir. 1996); Virella-Nieves v. Briggs & 
Stratton Corp., 53 F.3d 451, 454 (1st Cir. 1995); Fink v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 65 
F.3d 722, 724 (8th Cir. 1995); Reynolds v. Wagner, 55 F.3d 1426, 1429 (9th Cir. 1995); 
Weinstock v. Cleary, 16 F.3d 501, 503 (2d Cir. 1994); City of Chanute v. Williams 
Natural Gas Co., 31 F.3d 1041, 1046 (10th Cir. 1994); see also David N. May, Pioneer’s 
Paradox: Appellate Rule 4(a)(5) and the Rule Against Excusing Ignorance of Law, 48 
DRAKE L. REV. 677, 695-96 (2000) (discussing federal courts that have applied the 
Pioneer analysis to Rule 4(a)(5) and the effects of that application). 
 69. 65 F.3d 722, 724 (8th Cir. 1995) (finding that past decisions defining excusable 
neglect are no longer controlling precedent). 
 70. See Vogelsang v. Patterson Dental Co., 904 F.2d 427, 431 (8th Cir. 1990) 
(listing circumstances in which excusable neglect will not be found). 
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allow the trial court to extend the time for appeal under a showing of 
excusable neglect.71  Of these states, Hawaii has adopted the Pioneer 
standard of excusable neglect in reviewing untimely appeals.72  
Additionally, Colorado allows appellate courts to extend the time for 
appeal;73 Iowa allows only the Iowa Supreme Court to extend the time 
for appeal;74 while Pennsylvania allows late appeals in instances of non-
negligence.75 
Jurisdictions that either allow an extension for the time to file an 
appeal due to excusable neglect or make similar allowances for late 
appeals offer an obvious advantage to appellants compared with 
jurisdictions that make no such accommodations.  Minnesota falls into 
the latter category.  Although Rule 104.01 of the Minnesota Rules of 
Appellate Procedure is comparable to Federal Rule 4, Rule 104.01 differs 
from Rule 4 in that it contains no express provision allowing for the 
extension of a party’s time to appeal under any circumstance.76 
 
 71. See, e.g., D.C. CT. APP. R. 4(a)(4); HAW. R. APP. P. 4(a)(5); ME. R. APP. P. 
2(b)(3); MISS. R. APP. P. 4(g); MONT. R. APP. P. 5(c); N.M. R. APP. P. 12-201(E)(2); N.D. 
R. APP. P. 4(a); R.I. SUP. CT. ART. I, R. 4(a); UTAH R. APP. P. 4(e); VT. R. APP. P. 4. 
 72. Enos v. Pac. Transfer & Warehouse, Inc., 910 P.2d 116, 123-25 (Haw. 1996). 
 73. COLO. R. APP. P. 4(a). 
 74. Home-Crest Corp. v. Albright, 414 N.W.2d 89, 90 (Iowa 1987) (noting in dicta 
that an order of the court allowing an extension of time had the effect of ratifying the 
previous notice of appeal). 
 75. Bass v. Commonwealth, 401 A.2d 1133, 1135 (Pa. 1979) (holding that where 
papers were prepared for filing six days prior to expiration date and the secretary in 
charge of filing became ill, there was non-negligent failure to timely file an appeal).  
Previous to Bass, Pennsylvania courts had only allowed nunc pro tunc appeals in 
situations involving “fraud or some breakdown in the court’s operation.”  Id. (citing West 
Penn Power Co. v. Goddard, 333 A.2d 909, 912 (Pa. 1975)).  The court in Bass granted 
the appellant’s petition for an appeal nunc pro tunc based on its determination that 
counsel for the appellant was in some degree a “public officer” and that an appellant 
should not lose the day in court due to the non-negligent failure to timely file an appeal.  
Id.  The opinion in Bass elicited a vitriolic dissent that decried what it felt was a 
wholesale disregard for the rules and a signal to litigants that timeliness requirements had 
been abandoned.  Id. at 1136-38 (Roberts, J. dissenting).  Portions of the dissent bear a 
remarkable resemblance to portions in the J.R. opinion.  Compare Bass 401 A.2d at 
1136-38 with In re Welfare of J.R., Jr., 655 N.W.2d 1, 4-5 (Minn. 2003).  An appeal nunc 
pro tunc will be allowed if: (1) the appeal was untimely due to non-negligent 
circumstances relating to appellant or to appellant’s counsel, (2) the appeal is filed within 
a short time after the appellant or appellant’s counsel learns of the delay and has an 
opportunity to address the untimeliness, (3) the time period is very short, and (4) the 
appellee is not prejudiced by the delay.  Cook v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 
671 A.2d 1130, 1131 (Pa. 1996). 
 76. Compare MINN. R. CIV. APP. P. 104.01 with FED. R. APP. P. 4.  See also 
MAGNUSON & HERR, supra note 34, at § 104.2 (comparing Rule 104.01 of the Minnesota 
Rules of Appellate Procedure with federal counterpart Rule 4). 
10
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III. THE J.R. DECISION 
A.  The Facts as Presented by the Court 
Dena Rodacker77 (“Appellant”) is the natural mother of six 
children.78  Due to a lengthy history of mental illness and substance 
abuse, her parental rights to four of her children were involuntarily 
terminated in two separate proceedings in 1996 and 1997.79  J.R., Jr., 
Appellant’s fifth child, was born on April 13, 1998.80  Both Appellant 
and J.R., Jr. tested positive for cocaine at the time of his birth.81  Initially, 
Appellant’s parental rights were terminated and J.R., Jr. was placed in 
foster care where he remained for two and one-half years.82  
Subsequently, the court vacated the termination order, and J.R., Jr. was 
returned to Appellant in December 2000.83  On May 29, 2001, Appellant 
claimed that she could not keep J.R., Jr. or A.I.R., her sixth child, safe 
and voluntarily placed the children in foster care.84  Less than two 
months later, Appellant suffered a drug-induced psychotic episode, 
which resulted in her being committed to the Willmar Regional 
Treatment Center.85  Upon discharge, Appellant continued to use drugs 
and alcohol in a manner that violated the conditions of her provisional 
release.86 
In December 2001, a trial was held on a petition to terminate 
Appellant’s parental rights.87  Sheila Thomas, a licensed child 
psychologist, testified that J.R., Jr. appeared anxious about having a 
permanent place to live and that he viewed his sister and foster family as 
 
 77. Ms. Rodecker is engaging and well spoken.  Telephone Interview with Dena 
Rodecker, Appellant (June 27, 2003) (on file with the author).  She strongly disputes the 
facts of the case as presented by the court, still considers herself to be the mother of her 
children and cares very much for their welfare. Id.  Ms. Rodecker has spoken with other 
attorneys about her case but cannot afford the requested fees. Id.  She resides in Meeker 
County and currently has custody of her seventh child. Id. 
 78. In re Welfare of J.R., Jr., 655 N.W.2d 1, 7 (Minn. 2003). 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 7-8. 
 85. Id. at 8.  Two days prior to appellant’s psychotic episode, appellant had refused 
an attempt to be reunited with J.R., Jr., and suggested that he instead stay with his foster 
parents.  Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
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his family.88  Thomas stated that another “disruption” in J.R., Jr.’s 
placement would have a negative impact on his ability to trust and relate 
to adults.89  The children’s guardian ad litem also testified that it would 
be in the best interest of the children to terminate Appellant’s parental 
rights.90  On Feb. 5, 2002, the trial court terminated Appellant’s parental 
rights to J.R., Jr. and his sister A.I.R.91 
Appellant filed an appeal with the Minnesota Court of Appeals 
contending that the trial court erred on several issues.92  The notice of 
appeal was timely filed with respondent Meeker County and the court of 
appeals, but the guardian ad litem was not served until fourteen days 
after the thirty-day appeal deadline due to the attorney’s neglect.93  In 
determining the proper time period to take an appeal, the court of appeals 
relied on Minnesota Statutes section 260C.415, which provides in part 
that an appeal from juvenile court must be taken to the court of appeals 
within thirty days of the appealable order.94  The court then relied on 
Rule 103.01 of the Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure, which requires in 
part that “adverse parties” must be served with notice of appeal within 
the appeal period.95  The appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction 
after the court of appeals determined that the guardian ad litem was 
indeed an adverse party,96 and failure to serve a timely notice of appeal 
was a jurisdictional defect.97 
Appellant then filed an appeal with the Minnesota Supreme Court 
seeking a reversal of the court of appeals order, claiming that because 
termination of parental rights cases are of such importance, a technical 
violation of the rules of court procedure should not have prevented the 
original appeal from proceeding.98  Appellant’s counsel stated that 
 
 88. Id. at 8-9. 
 89. Id. at 9. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at 9-11. 
 93. Id. at 2. 
 94. Id. at 2-3; MINN. STAT. § 260C.415 (2002). 
 95. J.R., 655 N.W.2d at 3; MINN. R. CIV. APP. P. 103.01 subd. 1.  A child’s guardian 
ad litem is a party to a juvenile-protection matter.  MINN. R. JUV. P. 57.01 subd. 1(a). 
 96. Older Minnesota case law has held that in some instances a guardian ad litem is 
not an adverse party.  See In re Welfare of J.B. 623 N.W.2d 640, 643 (Minn. Ct. App. 
2001) (holding that a guardian ad litem was not an adverse party because the guardian 
was not adverse to the appeal), overruled by In re Welfare of J.R., Jr., 655 N.W.2d 1 
(Minn. 2003); Hofseth v. Hofseth, 456 N.W.2d 99, 102 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990) (holding 
that guardian ad litem was not an adverse party because guardian ad litem was appointed 
after the trial and had not previously taken an adverse position to the appellant). 
 97. J.R., 655 N.W.2d at 3. 
 98. Id. at 1-3. 
12
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Appellant did not cause the delay and was in total reliance on the 
services of her counsel; therefore, it was contended that Appellant should 
not be punished for the attorney’s error.99 
B.  The Minnesota Supreme Court’s Analysis 
The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals order 
and held that the failure to abide by the rules of procedure deprived the 
appellate court of jurisdiction.100  Therefore, because the appeal was not 
timely served on the guardian ad litem, the appeal was not perfected and 
dismissal was required.101  In doing so, the court noted that the appellate 
court erred in applying Minnesota Statutes section 260C.415 and Rule 
103.01 of the Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure, and should have 
instead relied on Rules 82.01 and 82.02 of the Rules of Juvenile 
Procedure.102  The court stated that the end result was not affected in that 
the thirty-day appeal period of Rule 82.01 subdivision 2 is identical with 
that of the statute, and there was no dispute that the guardian ad litem 
was an adverse party.103 
The court cited numerous cases where it had recognized its inherent 
authority to take an appeal in the interests of justice, even when filing or 
service requirements set forth in a rule or statute had not been met.104  
However, the court distinguished those cases from the case at hand by 
emphasizing that such deviations were based upon peculiar facts, such as 
recent changes in the law or interpretation issues, but not on the basis of 
attorney negligence or oversight.105  In doing so, the court rejected 
 
 99. Appellant’s Brief and Appendix at 17, In re Welfare of J.R., Jr., 655 N.W.2d 1 
(Minn. 2003) (No. C2-02-378).  Counsel for the appellant was appointed on March 1, 
2002, six days prior to the deadline for filing an appeal.  Id. at 16-17.  Though counsel 
represented Ms. Rodecker in the trial phase of J.R., counsel did not believe he had 
authority to pursue an appeal prior to his court appointment as appellate counsel.  Id. at 
17. 
 100. In re Welfare of J.R., Jr., 655 N.W.2d 1, 3 (Minn. 2003). 
 101. Id. at 3, 6. 
 102. Id. at 2-3. 
 103. Id. at 3. 
 104. Id. at 3-4 (citing Ruberg v. Skelly Oil Co., 297 N.W.2d 746, 749 (Minn. 1980); 
Krug v. Independent School Dist. No. 16, 293 N.W.2d 26, 29 (Minn. 1980); State v. 
M.A.P., 281 N.W.2d 334, 336-37 (Minn. 1979); E.C.I. Corp. v G.G.C. Co., 306 Minn. 
433, 435-36, 237 N.W.2d 627, 629 (1976)). 
 105. J.R., 655 N.W.2d at 4; see also Ruberg v. Skelly Oil Co., 297 N.W.2d 746, 749 
(Minn. 1980) (holding that even though appeal was technically defective, the appeal 
would be taken in the spirit of a recent rules change); Krug v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 16, 
293 N.W.2d 26, 29 (Minn. 1980) (taking late appeal in the interests of justice because 
district court amendment raised issue of whether the appeal ran from the original order or 
the amended order); E.C.I. Corp. v G.G.C. Co., 306 Minn. 433, 436, 237 N.W.2d 627, 
13
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Appellant’s request that the court excuse the delay by adopting an 
analysis similar to that used in Rule 60.02 motions to vacate default 
judgments.106  The court expressed doubts as to the utility of a Rule 
60.02 good cause exception made at the appellate level because the court 
had traditionally used a four-prong test that required a reasonable defense 
on the merits—an issue better evaluated by the trial court.107  
Furthermore, the court stated, “a good cause exception at the appellate 
court level would eviscerate the uniform, impartial application of the 
rules.”108 
The court emphasized the policy of placing the interests of the 
child109 foremost in a termination of parental rights case and the 
fundamental need to strictly enforce the rules as a means of avoiding 
unnecessary delays that could seriously affect a child’s opportunity to 
have a permanent home.110  Although the court recognized that such a 
policy could result in some cases not being heard on appeal, it stated that 
to do otherwise could equally inflict injustice upon the child.111 
Justice Paul H. Anderson, joined by Justice Page, filed a separate 
opinion that concurred in part and dissented in part.112  The dissent 
argued that while a strict interpretation of the rules required dismissal, 
such an interpretation was too restrictive in the context of terminating a 
natural parent’s parental rights.113  “We must be wary of a broom that 
sweeps too broadly and rules that are so strictly enforced that justice has 
the very real potential of being denied.”114  The dissent recognized the 
 
629 (1976) (holding that the parties knew the first judgment entered by the court was 
incorrect and though notice of appeal was not timely filed with the first judgment, it was 
timely filed with the amended judgment). 
 106. In re Welfare of J.R., Jr., 655 N.W.2d 1, 4-5 (Minn. 2003) (stating that allowing 
a good cause exception for failure to follow the rules would strip the rules of their 
impartial meaning and needlessly delay final resolutions). 
 107. Id. at 4 n.3 (quoting Nguyen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 558 N.W.2d 
487, 490 (Minn. 1997)). 
 108. Id. at 4. 
 109. Minnesota courts balance three factors in determining the best interests of a 
child: “(1) the child’s interest in preserving the parent-child relationship; (2) the parent’s 
interest in preserving the parent-child relationship; and (3) any competing interest of the 
child.”  In re Welfare of R.T.B., 492 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992).  “Competing 
interests include such things as a stable environment, health considerations, and the 
child’s preferences.”  Id.  The interests of the parent and the child are not given equal 
weight, and the best interests of the child are the leading consideration for the court.  In 
re M.H., 595 N.W.2d 223, 227 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999). 
 110. J.R., 655 N.W.2d at 5. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. at 6 (Anderson, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
 113. Id. at 6-7. 
 114. Id. 
14
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court’s constitutional power to hear any appeal in the interests of justice 
and stated that the court should have reached the merits of the case.115  
After reviewing the findings of the district court, the dissent agreed with 
the order to terminate Appellant’s parental rights.116 
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE J.R. DECISION 
A.  A Correct Answer to the Wrong Question 
The decision of the court that an untimely appeal deprives the 
appellate court of jurisdiction is correct and widely supported by 
Minnesota case law.117  Additionally, Minnesota case law holds that 
failure to timely serve an adverse party is in and of itself a jurisdictional 
defect.118  This holding finds wide support among state courts; it is 
universally held that untimely appeals in civil actions are void for lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction.119  This holds true even among cases that 
involve termination of parental rights.120  Furthermore, though the 
Minnesota Supreme Court has the inherent authority to take jurisdiction 
of an untimely appeal, this power has not been conferred to lower 
appellate courts.121 
While the Minnesota Supreme Court was correct in its decision that 
 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. at 11. 
 117. See, e.g., Tischendorf v. Tischendorf, 321 N.W.2d 405, 409 (Minn. 1982); 
Schaust v. Town Bd. of Hollywood Township, 295 Minn. 571, 573, 204 N.W.2d 646, 
648 (1973); Township of Honner v. Redwood County, 518 N.W.2d 639, 641 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 1994); In re Welfare of D.B., 463 N.W.2d 301, 302 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990). 
 118. See, e.g., Johnson v. Nessel Town, 486 N.W.2d 834, 837 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992) 
(dismissing appeal for failure to serve one of the respondents); Petersen v. Petersen, 352 
N.W.2d 797, 797 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (holding against the appellant who failed to 
serve notice of appeal on the respondent within time limit). 
 119. See, e.g., McCormack v. AmSouth Bank, 759 So. 2d 538, 541 (Ala. 1999); 
Hahn v. D.C. Water & Sewer Auth., 727 A.2d 317, 319 (D.C. 1999); Hays v. Hays, 612 
N.W.2d 817, 819 (Iowa Ct. App. 2000); State v. Bassham, 762 N.E.2d 963, 965 (Ohio 
2002).  Even in jurisdictions that allow a trial court to extend the time for filing a late 
appeal due to excusable neglect, the failure to timely file deprives the appellate court of 
jurisdiction.  See, e.g., In re Ak.V., 747 A.2d 570, 573-74 (D.C. 2000). 
 120. See, e.g., Wright v. Montgomery County Dep’t of Pensions and Sec., 423 So. 2d 
256, 258 (Ala. Civ. App. 1982); In re Alyssa H. v. Charles H., 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 809, 812 
(Ct. App. 1994); In re A.E., 994 P.2d 465, 467 (Colo. Ct. App. 1999); In re C.P., 777 So. 
2d 470, 472 (La. 2001); In re Jasso v. Jasso, 752 P.2d 790, 791 (N.M. Ct. App. 1987). 
 121. See Township of Honner v. Redwood County, 518 N.W.2d 639, 641 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 1994) (holding that even though the supreme court has indicated that it has the 
authority to accept untimely appeals, that authority has not been extended to the lower 
appeals courts). 
15
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an untimely appeal deprived the lower appellate court of jurisdiction, the 
court erred by not exercising its constitutional power to look beyond the 
procedural rules in order to act in the interests of justice and hear the 
appeal.  In refusing to act, the court stated three primary objections: (1) 
J.R. was distinguishable from previous cases where the court had elected 
to deviate from the rules,122 (2) an analysis similar to a Rule 60.02 good 
cause exception is unworkable at the appellate level,123 and (3) child 
protection cases are in particular need of expeditious treatment.124  Each 
of these objections will be examined in turn. 
1.  Distinguishing Termination of Parental Rights Cases from 
Other Civil Cases 
The Minnesota Supreme Court distinguished J.R. from past cases in 
which it had elected to deviate from the rules and hear an untimely 
appeal based on the peculiar facts of those cases.125  In particular, the 
court noted that when it had deviated from the rules, it did so only after 
recent changes in the law or interpretation issues and not amid attorney 
negligence or oversight.126  In his dissent, Justice Paul H. Anderson 
suggested that termination of parental rights cases should be 
distinguished by their subject matter.127  This concept that termination of 
parental rights cases may at times be treated differently than other civil 
cases is most apparent in situations where counsel has been appointed, as 
it was in J.R., and there has been a claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel.128 
When a state court allows an untimely appeal in a termination of 
parental rights case due to a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel, 
the substantive theory runs that because due process requires counsel 
appointed under a statutory directive to provide effective assistance, the 
same standards for counsel appointed in a criminal proceeding may be 
applied to counsel appointed in a termination of parental rights 
 
 122. In re Welfare of J.R., Jr., 655 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Minn. 2003). 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. at 5. 
 125. See supra note 105. 
 126. J.R., 655 N.W.2d at 4. 
 127. Id. at 6 (Anderson, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (“This is a too 
restrictive interpretation of the law, especially in the context of termination of a natural 
parent’s parental rights.”). 
 128. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 48 (2d Pocket ed. 2001) (defining ineffective 
assistance of counsel under assistance of counsel as “[a] representation in which the 
defendant is deprived of a fair trial because the lawyer handles the case unreasonably 
[usually] either by performing incompetently or by not devoting full effort to the 
defendant, [especially] because of a conflict of interest”). 
16
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proceeding.129  The party claiming ineffective assistance of counsel must 
show that counsel’s performance was deficient and that actual prejudice 
resulted.130  In cases where ineffective assistance of counsel is shown, 
courts have used a variety of methods to extend the time for appeal, such 
as remanding the case back to the trial court for resentencing131 or 
designating that a writ of habeas corpus132 be filed with the trial court.133 
Ineffective assistance of counsel cases from other jurisdictions are 
applicable to J.R. in that they stand for the proposition that termination of 
parental rights proceedings affect important due process rights protected 
by the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution134 and 
such cases may at times be treated in a manner different from other civil 
cases.135  Cases such as these also recognize that when a parent loses his 
or her parental rights due to an attorney’s actions, there is little recourse 
for the parent and monetary damages in a malpractice suit are wholly 
inadequate.136 
 
 129. See, e.g., Farley v. Dep’t of Servs. for Children, Youth & Their Families, 765 
A.2d 951, 951 (Del. 2000) (stating parallel remedy between criminal and parental rights 
termination cases); In re E.H., 609 So. 2d 1289, 1290-91 (Fla. 1992) (determining that a 
writ of habeas corpus is the proper procedure in a civil parental rights termination case 
where the appeal has been untimely); In re T.M.C., 988 P.2d 241, 243 (Kan. Ct. App. 
1999) (extending fundamental fairness exception to termination order cases where it has 
not been extended to other civil proceedings). 
 130. “The defendant must affirmatively prove that his counsel’s representation ‘fell 
below an objective standard of reasonableness’ and ‘that there is a reasonable probability 
that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 
different.’ ”  Gates v. State, 398 N.W.2d 558, 561 (Minn. 1987) (quoting Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694 (1984)). 
 131. See, e.g., Farley, 765 A.2d at 951. 
 132. BLACK’S, supra note 1, at 638 (defining habeas corpus as “[t]he name given to 
a variety of writs . . . having for their object to bring a party before a court or judge”). 
 133. In re E.H., 609 So. 2d 1289, 1290-91 (Fla. 1992). 
 134. See In re T.M.C., 988 P.2d 241, 243 (Kan. Ct. App. 1999) (“Termination of 
parental rights proceedings affect important substantive due process rights.”); see also 
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (stating in part that no state shall “deprive any person of 
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law”).  But see In re Joshua R., 657 
N.W.2d 209, 214 (Neb. 2003) (holding that a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel 
does not extend to untimely appeal, and due process is not denied when appellant was 
given fair and full opportunity to litigate). 
 135. See supra note 129 and accompanying text. 
 136. See In re AK.V., 747 A.2d 570, 576-77 (D.C. 2000) (stating that the usual 
remedy of money damages in a civil case for misfeasance or nonfeasance of counsel is 
“wholly inadequate in a neglect case”); In re K.L., 91 S.W.3d 1, 11 (Tex. Ct. App. 2002) 
(stating that money damages are inadequate in termination cases where the effect of 
counsel’s deficiencies may be irrevocable).  In presenting its holding, the court in K.L. 
cited to Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 759 (1982) for the proposition that 
termination of parental rights cases differ from other civil cases in that once affirmed, the 
result is final and irrevocable.  K.L., 91 S.W.3d at 11. 
17
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In J.R., the Meeker County District Court initially rejected 
Appellant’s request for the appointment of appellate counsel.137  Rule 
61.02 of the Rules of Juvenile Procedure does not explicitly state that 
counsel may be appointed in an appeal proceeding, and the court found it 
lacked authority under the rule to do so.138  Later, after taking a broad 
view of Rule 61.02 and recognizing the substantial rights at stake in a 
termination of parental rights proceeding, the court reconsidered its 
position and appointed appellate counsel.139   
Recently, the Minnesota Supreme Court Juvenile Protection Rules 
Committee proposed amending the Rules of Juvenile Procedure “to 
extend through appeal, if any, the basic principle that each person 
appearing in court has the right to be represented by counsel.”140  
Additionally, the committee proposed that the same attorney represent 
the client in both the trial court and appellate court proceedings.141  The 
committee chose to delete the latter proposed amendment in part due to 
concern by public defenders that such a rule could hinder an ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim and that many trial court attorneys are not 
necessarily experienced appellate court attorneys.142   
The concerns of the district court that an appeal be made available 
in this case, and the concerns of public defenders that some trial court 
attorneys are not experienced appellate court attorneys, suggest that the 
Minnesota Supreme Court should have taken a more lenient view of 
counsel’s failure to timely serve one of the parties to a juvenile matter.  
Three unpublished cases indicate that Minnesota recognizes the 
possibility of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim in a termination 
of parental rights case, though none of the cases was in the context of an 
untimely appeal.143  Furthermore, the appellant in J.R. did not bring a 
 
 137. In re Welfare of J.R., Jr., 655 N.W.2d 1 (Minn. 2003), Amended Order, No. J7-
01-50206 (Minn. 8th Jud. Dist. Ct. Feb. 27, 2002), rev’d, Order Appointing Appellate 
Counsel, No. J7-01-50206 (Minn. 8th Jud. Dist. Ct. Feb. 28, 2002). 
 138. Id.  See also MINN. R. JUV. P. 61.02 subd. 2(a) (“If the child’s parent or legal 
custodian desires counsel but is financially unable to employ it, the court shall appoint 
counsel to represent the parent or legal custodian in any juvenile protection matter in 
which the court determines that such appointment is appropriate.”). 
 139. In re Welfare of J.R., Jr., 655 N.W.2d 1 (Minn. 2003), Order Appointing 
Appellate Counsel, No. J7-01-50206 (Minn. 8th Jud. Dist. Ct. Feb. 28, 2002). 
 140. MINN. S. CT. JUV. PROTECTION RULES COMM., FINAL REPORT AND PROPOSED 
AMENDMENTS TO THE MINNESOTA RULES OF JUVENILE PROCEDURE JUVENILE PROTECTION 
RULES 15 (Apr. 7, 2003), available at http://www.courts.state.mn.us/cio/ 
public_notices/Juv_%20Prot_Rules_Report.doc (last visited Nov. 15, 2003). 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. at 15-16. 
 143. In re D.F., No. C1-02-114, 2002 Minn. App. LEXIS 868, at *12 (Minn. Ct. 
App. July 23, 2002); In re B.M.S., No. C5-98-708, 1998 Minn. App. LEXIS 1124, at *10 
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motion for ineffective assistance of counsel and may not even have 
known such an action was possible.144 
2.  Looking to the Federal System for a Workable Analysis 
The Minnesota Supreme Court denied appellant’s request that the 
court adopt an analysis similar to that used in Rule 60.02 motions to 
vacate default judgments.145  The court took this to mean a “good cause” 
exception, which requires a four-prong test that provides in part that the 
party seeking relief must demonstrate a reasonable defense on the 
merits.146  The court denounced the workability of such an analysis at the 
appellate level largely because a trial court is better suited to judge the 
merits of any particular case.147  Though not mentioned by the court, this 
argument is buoyed by the suggestion that judging the merits of a 
defense prior to arguments by the parties may appear to prejudice the 
appeal.148  Additionally, the court was correct in denying a “good cause” 
exception largely based on the fact that a good cause standard applies in 
situations where the delay was not due to fault, excusable or 
otherwise.149  Counsel for the appellant admitted that he was responsible 
for the delay,150 and thus an excusable neglect exception would be more 
appropriate. 
Had the court chosen to review the reasons for failure to serve a 
timely appeal under the mantle of excusable neglect, a more suitable 
standard would be similar to that adopted by the United States Supreme 
Court in Pioneer Investment Services v. Brunswick Associates.151  Under 
Pioneer, “excusable neglect” is understood to encompass situations in 
 
(Minn. Ct. App. Oct. 6, 1998); In re L.N., No. C8-90-698, 1990 Minn. App. LEXIS 969 
at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. Oct. 9, 1990). 
 144. Appellant has stated that even though other attorneys have indicated they may 
be able to help her, she is not able to afford their services.  Telephone Interview with 
Dena Rodecker, Appellant (June 27, 2003) (on file with author). 
 145. In re Welfare of J.R., Jr., 655 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Minn. 2003). 
 146. Id.  See also Nguyen v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 558 N.W.2d 487, 490 
(Minn. 1997) (stating elements of four-prong good cause test). 
 147. J.R., 655 N.W.2d at 4 n.3. 
 148. “[T]his court must avoid any appearance of prejudging an appeal without the 
record and arguments of the parties.”  Maddox v. Dep’t of Human Servs., 400 N.W.2d 
136, 139 n.1 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987). 
 149. “[T]he good cause standard ‘applies in situations where there is not fault—
excusable or otherwise;’ i.e., ‘the need for an extension is . . . occasioned by something 
that is not within the control of the movant.’ ”  Gibbons v. United States, 317 F.3d 852, 
854 (8th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted). 
 150. Appellant’s Brief and Appendix at 17, In re Welfare of J.R., Jr., 655 N.W.2d 1 
(Minn. 2003) (No. C2-02-378). 
 151. 507 U.S. 380 (1993). 
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which failure to comply with a filing deadline is attributable to 
negligence.152  The Pioneer standard takes into account all the relevant 
circumstances, including prejudice to the other party, the reason for the 
delay, the duration of the delay, and whether the movant acted in good 
faith.153  Additionally, Pioneer suggests that in some circumstances, 
negligence on the part of an attorney can constitute excusable neglect.154 
A majority of federal circuits, including the Eighth Circuit, have 
adopted the Pioneer standard when reviewing untimely appeals due to 
excusable neglect.155  Admittedly, the federal system is operating under 
appellate rules that allow district courts to extend the time for appeal, 
whereas Minnesota rules make no similar allowance.156  However, the 
strength of the Pioneer standard is that it does not rely on a meritorious 
defense and, even more favorably, Pioneer states that the determination 
of whether the failure to abide by a specified time limit constitutes 
excusable neglect is an equitable one.157 
The Pioneer standard is similar to a possible use of discretion as 
described in dicta in the Minnesota Supreme Court decision of Nguyen v. 
State Farm.158  In Nguyen, the court analyzed a defendant’s failure to file 
a proper request for trial and stated that if the matter was discretionary 
with the court, reasons for exercising discretion would include: (1) that 
failure to file was inadvertent and a result of oversight, (2) the party 
acted with diligence upon learning of the oversight, and (3) the opposing 
party was not prejudiced.159 
3.  Conflicting Policy After J.R. 
The Minnesota Supreme Court’s emphasis on the rights of the child 
to a timely appeal largely shaped the court’s decision not to exercise its 
inherent authority to take an untimely appeal in the interests of justice.160  
The court evidenced the importance of this policy by comparing Rule 
82.02 of the Juvenile Rules of Procedure, which provides thirty days to 
 
 152. Id. at 394-95. 
 153. Id. at 395. 
 154. See id. at 394; see also MOORE ET AL., supra note 25, at § 60.41[1][a] 
(interpreting the effects of Pioneer to include attorney neglect or negligence). 
 155. See supra note 68 and accompanying text. 
 156. See supra Part II.C. 
 157. Pioneer Inv. Servs. v. Brunswick Assoc., 507 U.S. 380, 395 (1993). 
 158. 558 N.W.2d 487, 491 (Minn. 1997). 
 159. Id. at 491. 
 160. See In re Welfare of J.R., Jr., 655 N.W.2d 1, 5 (Minn. 2003) (stating that 
making an exception to the Rules of Procedure for child protection cases would be in 
direct conflict with the policy that such cases in particular need to be expeditiously 
handled). 
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appeal juvenile protection matters, with Rule 104.01 of the Rules of Civil 
Appellate Procedure, which provides sixty days to appeal in other civil 
cases.161 
While the emphasis on such a policy may be outwardly admirable, it 
may be equally shortsighted in that the United States Supreme Court has 
stressed the importance of the appeals process in cases where parental 
status is in question.162  “Parental status termination is ‘irretrievably 
destructive’ of the most fundamental family relationship. And the risk of 
error . . . is considerable.”163  Additionally, the Court has said that it 
shares a strong interest with the parent in a correct decision and that in 
some cases, it even has a stronger interest in informal procedures.164 
The policy carried forward from J.R.—that cases involving the 
termination of parental rights are in particular need of expeditious 
handling165—runs contrary to the policy previously stated by the 
Minnesota Supreme Court that favors granting relief when a judgment is 
entered through no fault of the client.166  By the court’s own admission, 
this new and strongly stated emphasis on strict application of the rules of 
procedure in cases involving the termination of parental rights may result 
in some cases not being heard on appeal.167  The new policy has quickly 
been adopted by the lower courts168 and has been extended beyond the 
situation of untimely filings to include a situation where the court refused 
to give a mother more time to prove herself to be drug free.169 
 
 161. Id.  Compare MINN. R. JUV. P. 82.02  with MINN. R. CIV. APP. P. 104.01. 
 162. See M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 121 (1996) (commenting in a termination of 
parental rights case where a mother’s appeal was denied due to her inability to afford 
court records). 
 163. Id. 
 164. See Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 31 (1981) (discussing the right 
of an indigent parent to receive court-appointed counsel in a termination of parental 
rights proceeding). 
 165. J.R., 655 N.W.2d at 5. 
 166. See Nguyen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 558 N.W.2d 487, 491 (Minn. 
1997) (agreeing that a client “should not be a victim of his attorney’s carelessness”); 
Charson v. Temple Israel, 419 N.W.2d 488, 491 (Minn. 1988) (recognizing that even 
under the general principles of agency where attorney neglect is chargeable to the client, 
the court has scrutinized the client’s actions apart from that of the attorney); Duenow v. 
Lindeman, 223 Minn. 505, 518, 27 N.W.2d 421, 429 (1947) (“Courts will relieve parties 
from the consequences of the neglect or mistakes of their attorney, when it can be done 
without substantial prejudice to their adversaries.”). 
 167. J.R., 655 N.W.2d at 5. 
 168. In re Children of S.C., 656 N.W.2d 580, 584 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003) (stating the 
policy of J.R.—that child protection cases in particular need to be expeditiously 
handled—in its holding that a motion to vacate judgment in termination of parental rights 
proceeding was untimely filed). 
 169. In re Children of J.J., No. C9-02-1592, 2003 Minn. App. LEXIS 367 at *7 n.4 
(Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 8, 2003) (citing to J.R. for the proposition that each delay in 
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While the court was correct in stating that delays in termination of 
parental rights can seriously affect a child’s chance for permanent 
placement,170 the termination of a parent’s rights by no means guarantees 
that a child will be adopted.  The 2003 Adoption and Foster Care 
Analysis and Reporting System Report (AFCARS Report) released by 
the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services shows that on a 
national level, the number of children living in foster care whose parents 
have had their parental rights terminated was more than thirty percent 
higher than the total number of children adopted in the same year.171  
The hard facts are that many children are never adopted,172 and the 
national mean time for those who are adopted is sixteen months after 
their parents’ parental rights have been terminated.173  In Minnesota, the 
mean is 25.65 months, the second highest in the nation.174 
Legal scholar Martin Guggenheim examined two states that have 
expedited termination proceedings and found that as the number of 
children freed for adoption soared, the number of actual adoptions failed 
to keep pace.175  In Minnesota, the state ward population rose by fifty-
one percent from 1993 to 1998.176  In light of these statistics, the stated 
 
terminating a parent’s rights equates to a delay in a child’s opportunity to have a 
permanent home, while discussing a mother’s inability to stay with a treatment program 
and the need to eliminate such a delay). 
 170. See J.R., 655 N.W.2d at 5 (paraphrasing NATIONAL COUNCIL OF JUVENILE AND 
FAMILY COURT JUDGES, RESOURCE GUIDELINES: IMPROVING COURT PRACTICE IN CHILD 
ABUSE & NEGLECT CASES 14 (Spring 1995), available at 
http://www.pppncjfcj.org/html/publications.html) (last visited Nov. 15, 2003). 
 171. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., THE AFCARS REPORT 3, 5 (Mar. 
2003), available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/publications/afcars/report8.pdf 
(last visited Nov. 15, 2003).  The 2003 AFCARS Report compiles statistics for fiscal year 
2001.  Id. at 1.  States are required to submit AFCARS data semi-annually.  U.S. DEP’T 
OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., About AFCARS, 
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/dis/afcars/about.htm (last visited Nov. 15, 2003). 
 172. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., ADOPTION FACT SHEET 2, at 
http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/adoption.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2003); Martin Guggenheim, 
The Effects of Recent Trends to Accelerate the Termination of Parental Rights of 
Children in Foster Care—An Empirical Analysis in Two States, 29 FAM. L.Q. 121, 129 
(1995). 
 173. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., supra note 170, at 5. 
 174. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., Table 04-ADOPT, at 
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/dis/tables/time02.htm (last visited Nov. 15, 2003).  
This table is current as of Sept. 30, 2002.  Id. 
 175. Guggenheim, supra note 172, at 127-34.  The two states surveyed, Michigan 
and New York, were chosen because they have a significant foster care population and 
maintain statewide statistics.  Id. at 126.  Michigan data was from 1986 through 1992 and 
New York data from 1987 through 1991.  Id.  Mr. Guggenheim was a professor of 
Clinical Law and the Director of Clinical and Advocacy Programs at New York 
University School of Law when he wrote the article.  Id. at 121. 
 176. ESTHER WATTENBERG & MEGHAN KELLEY, A MEMO ON LEGAL ORPHANS: ARE 
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policy of J.R. that cases involving the termination of parental rights are 
in particular need of expediency,177 loses some of its intended luster. 
It is not the intent of this case note to speculate on whether J.R., Jr. 
would or would not have been adopted, nor is it the intent that the court 
should have taken into account such a speculation when making its 
decision on whether to allow an untimely appeal.178  Rather, it is the 
position of this note that in light of the above facts, an expeditious 
termination of parental rights may not always be in the best interest of 
the child, and it was unwise for the court to generalize that parental rights 
termination cases are in particular need of such handling.179 
B.  A Proposed Excusable Neglect Analysis for Untimely Appeals in 
Termination of Parental Rights Cases 
Jurisdictions that allow a trial court to extend the time for appeal 
due to an attorney’s excusable neglect offer a distinct advantage to 
appellants over a system such as Minnesota’s, which makes no 
comparable exception for an extension.  The Minnesota Supreme Court 
should have identified this shortcoming and noted that in cases involving 
the termination of parental rights, the accepted civil remedy allowing a 
client to recover for the failure of counsel through damages in a 
malpractice suit is wholly inadequate.180  Furthermore, the court should 
have recognized that particularly in Minnesota, the policy generalizing 
that child protection cases are in particular need of expediency is not 
statistically accurate.181  By noting the above, the court would have had a 
means of distinguishing termination of parental rights appeals from 
appeals in other civil cases. 
 
WE CREATING A NEW CLASS OF CHILDREN IN LIMBO? 2 (Apr. 30, 1999), 
http://ssw.che.umn.edu/cascw/Various%20Articles/orphan5.pdf (last visited Nov. 15, 
2003).  Ms. Wattenberg is the Director of the Center for Advanced Studies in Child 
Welfare at the University of Minnesota and a Professor at the School of Social Work.  Id. 
at 4. 
 177. See In re Welfare of J.R., Jr., 655 N.W.2d 1, 5 (Minn. 2003) (stating that 
making an exception to the Rules of Procedure for child protection cases would be in 
direct conflict with the policy that such cases in particular need to be expeditiously 
handled). 
 178. Martin Guggenheim has suggested that before a parent’s parental rights are 
terminated, “courts should require evidence regarding the probability of adoption and 
insist that termination should not be ordered unless a high probability for adoption 
exists.”  See Guggenheim, supra note 172, at 135-36. 
 179. “[T]hese cases in particular need to be expeditiously handled.”  J.R., 655 
N.W.2d at 5 (emphasis added). 
 180. See supra Part IV.A.1. 
 181. See supra Part IV.A.3. 
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Having distinguished J.R., the court should have looked to the 
federal system for a workable analysis and reviewed the appellant’s 
untimely notice of appeal using a flexible excusable neglect standard 
similar to that introduced in Pioneer Investment Services v. Brunswick 
Associates.182  Under such an analysis, the court would determine: (1) 
the prejudice to the appellee; (2) the length of the delay and its impact on 
judicial proceedings; (3) the reason for the delay, including whether it 
was within reasonable control of the appellant; and (4) the good faith 
effort by the appellant.  As stated in Pioneer, the court would take into 
account all relevant circumstances.  If the analysis was satisfied, the 
court would then exercise its inherent authority to take an appeal in the 
interests of justice even when the filing or service requirements of the 
appeal are not timely. 
While adopting an excusable neglect standard similar to that of 
Pioneer would not have guaranteed the success of appellant’s request to 
excuse the untimely notice of appeal on the guardian ad litem,183 such an 
analysis would allow the court to make an equitable decision and give 
the court much-needed flexibility in the area of parental rights 
termination appeals.  Furthermore, this analysis would relieve the court 
of having to base its analysis on the merits of the case itself as is required 
in a Rule 60.02 “good cause” analysis.184 
V. CONCLUSION 
It is difficult to fault the Minnesota Supreme Court for strictly 
following the rules of appellate procedure.  In doing so, it made what 
could have been a troublesome ethical decision much easier to swallow.  
Add in the dismal facts of the case as presented, and the decision in J.R. 
actually becomes quite palatable.  However, had the mother been more 
sympathetic or the trial court made some grievous error of law, then 
 
 182. 507 U.S. 380 (1993). 
 183. It has been suggested that under the Pioneer standard, attorney negligence may 
constitute excusable neglect. MOORE ET AL., supra note 25, at § 60.41[1][a].  However, 
case law has not shown this to be an accurate interpretation of Pioneer.  See, e.g., Lowry 
v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 211 F.3d 457, 464 (8th Cir. 2000) (“Notwithstanding the 
‘flexible’ Pioneer standard, experienced counsel’s misapplication of clear and 
unambiguous procedural rules cannot excuse his failure to file a timely notice of 
appeal.”); Advanced Estimating Sys., Inc. v. Riney, 130 F.3d 996, 998 (11th Cir. 1997) 
(holding that attorney’s misunderstanding of plain language of a rule cannot constitute 
excusable neglect). 
 184. The court discussed its doubts as to the usefulness of a Rule 60.02 type analysis 
to an appellate court because the analysis requires a reasonable defense on the merits and 
the issue is better suited for the trial court.  In re Welfare of J.R., Jr., 655 N.W.2d 1, 4 n.3 
(Minn. 2003). 
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quite possibly the J.R. decision would be viewed as a travesty.  Someday 
the described situation may arise—such a mother or father may be put in 
such a situation.  When that day comes and the aggrieved parent enters 
the harsh spotlight of the court, the precedent185 of J.R. will be looming 
in the shadows. 
In J.R., the Minnesota Supreme Court had the opportunity to adopt 
an analysis that would have allowed it to “look beyond procedural rules 
in order to act in the interests of justice.”186  The court’s initial reliance 
and subsequent rejection of a Rule 60.02 analysis provided the court with 
a convenient and outwardly legitimate means of turning away a parent 
who has lost the right to appeal the termination of her parental rights due 
to a mistake of her attorney.  But at what cost?  Certainly implementing 
an excusable neglect analysis similar to that used by the federal system 
would have been a judicial leap, but the court by its own admission 
stated that under a strict application of the rules of procedure, some cases 
likely will not be heard.187  Surely this does not provide justice for the 
child or the parent.  The power to terminate a parent’s rights has been 
described as “the family law equivalent of the death penalty in a criminal 
case.”188  By adopting a flexible analysis tailored to termination of 
parental rights cases, the court would be in a better position to make 
equitable decisions in the best interests of justice and not be tethered to a 
difficult precedent. 
 
 185. “Particularly where a precedent or series of precedents has been treated as 
authoritative for a long time, courts are generally reticent to deviate from that policy, 
even if they would rule otherwise if the question were one of first impression.”  20 AM. 
JUR. 2D Courts § 147 (1995).  “We should not be quick to overrule long-standing 
precedent . . . .  We can overrule a previous decision only when there is good reason to do 
so.  Only if we are convinced that the prior decision is erroneous should we not let that 
decision stand.”  State v. Hamm, 423 N.W.2d 379, 380 (Minn. 1988). 
 186. J.R., 655 N.W.2d at 6 (Anderson, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
 187. Id. at 5. 
 188. In re Hoffman, 776 N.E.2d 485, 487 (Ohio 2002); see also In re K.D.L. v. State, 
58 P.3d 181, 186 (Nev. 2002) (stating that termination of a parent’s rights is “tantamount 
to imposition of a civil death penalty”). 
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